In this work, we study the impact of dynamically changing link capacities on the performance bounds of LIS (Longest-In-System) and SIS (Shortest-InSystem) protocols on specific networks (that can be modelled as Directed Acyclic Graphs-DAGs) and stability bounds of greedy contention-resolution protocols running on arbitrary networks under the Adversarial Queueing Theory. Especially, we consider the model of dynamic capacities, where each link capacity may take on integer values from [1, C] with C > 1, under a (w, ρ)-adversary. The stability of a greedy protocol guarantees that the number of packets in the network remains bounded at all times. However, it does not guarantee the existence of small bounds on the packet delay. We, therefore, show:
Introduction
Motivation-Framework. We are interested in the behavior of packet-switched networks in which packets arrive dynamically at the nodes and they are routed in discrete time steps across the links. Recent years have witnessed a vast amount of work on analyzing packet-switched networks under nonprobabilistic assumptions (rather than stochastic ones); We work within a model of worst-case continuous packet arrivals, originally proposed by Borodin et al. [3] and termed Adversarial Queueing Theory to reflect the assumption of an adversarial way of packet generation and path determination.
A major issue that arises in such a setting is that of stability-will the number of packets in the network remain bounded at all times? Besides the existence or not of upper bounds on the packet delays, a complementary question concerning stability is whether stability guarantees that there are small bounds on packet delays. The answer to these questions may depend on the rate of injecting packets into the network, the capacity of the links, which is the rate at which a link forwards outgoing packets, and the protocol that is used to resolve the conflict when more than one packet wants to cross a given link in a single time step. We study these questions considering that packets are injected by an adversary (rather than by an oblivious randomized process) and capacities are chosen by the same adversary in a dynamic way.
Most studies of packet-switched networks assume that one packet can cross a network link in a single time step. This assumption is well motivated when we assume that all network links are identical. However, a packet-switched network can contain different types of links, which is common especially in large-scale networks like Internet. Then, it is well motivated to assign a capacity to each link that takes on values from the integer set [1, C] with C > 1. If C is a large integer, we can consider approximately as a link failure the assigning of unit capacity to a link and the assigning of capacity C as the proper service rate. Therefore, the study of protocol stability under this model of dynamically changing capacities can be considered as an approximation of the fault-tolerance of a network where links can temporarily fail (zero capacity).
In this work we consider the impact on performance bounds and stability properties if the adversary besides the packet injections in paths which it determines, it also can set the capacities of network edges in each time step. This subfield of study was initiated by Borodin et al. in [4] . Note that we continue to assume uniform packet sizes. Furthermore, we consider greedy contention-resolution protocols (all of which enjoy simple implementations)-always advance a packet across a queue (but one packet at each discrete time step) whenever there resides at least one packet in the queue, such as LIS (Longest-in-System) that gives priority to the packets that have been for the longest amount of time in the network and SIS (Shortest-in-System) that gives priority to the packets that have been for the shortest amount of time in the network.
Roughly speaking a protocol P is stable [3] on a network G against an adversary A of rate r if there is an integer B (which may depend on G and A) such that the number of packets in the system is bounded at all times by B. Moreover, a a network G is universally stable [3] if every greedy protocol is stable against every adversary of rate less than 1 on G. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) are universally stable in the more powerful model of general dynamic capacities-each is stable against every adversary of rate less than 1 for every protocol [4, Theorem 3] . Contribution. We use here the model of dynamic capacities that has been initiated in [4] where link capacities may take on integer values in the interval [1, C] with C > 1 1 under a (w, ρ)-adversary that injects packets at rate ρ with window size w. In this framework, we show:
• The delay of packets on DAGs (where LIS is running on top of them) is upper bounded by O(iwCρ) where i is the level of a node in a DAG (the length of the longest path leading to node v when nodes are ordered by the topological order induced by the graph). We use doubleinduction on time and the node level to prove it.
• We make this performance bound tight showing a lower bound of Ω(iwCρ) on the packet delay that is suffered by a packet targeted with a node u of level i. The maximum queue size in this case is (w + 1)C. The proof of this result is based on an involved adversarial construction.
In a similar way, we prove that SIS has a lower bound of Ω(iwCρ) on the packet delay when it is running on top of DAGs.
• We show two simple results which provide some upper bounds on the allowable rate of injections that still guarantees stability. Specifically, we prove that any arbitrary network running a greedy contention-resolution protocol is stable as long as the injection rate does not exceed
is the length of the longest path in the network that can be followed by any packet. A slightly improved result is proved for the stability threshold in the case of a special class of greedy protocols, the time priority protocols. Such a protocol is stable on all networks as long as the injection rate of the adversary does not exceed
Roughly speaking, the results that have been obtained in this paper show that the linear performance bounds that have been proved in the classical setting of Adversarial Queueing Theory remain linear when link capacities vary dynamically although the adversary in such environments is more powerful. The only difference is that performance bounds in the dynamic setting have as expense a multiplicative factor of C. The same holds for the stability thresholds that are obtained in this paper for dynamically varying link capacities. Related Work. Adversarial Queueing Theory was developed by Borodin et al. [3] as a more realistic model that replaces traditional stochastic assumptions in Queueing Theory by more robust, worstcase ones. Adversarial queueing theory received a lot of interest in the study of stability and instability issues (see, e.g., [1, 6, 7, 10, 11] ). The universal stability of various natural greedy protocols (LIS, SIS, NTS (Nearest-to-Source), FTG (Furthestto-Go)) has been established by Andrews et al. [1] . Furthermore, the set of universally stable networks has been well-characterized [1, 3] (DAGs, trees, ring). Stability Bounds for Greedy Protocols. The subfield of proving stability thresholds for greedy protocols on every network was first initiated by Diaz et al. [6] showing an upper bound on injection rate for the stability of FIFO in networks with a finite number of queues that is based on network parameters. This result was significantly improved for all networks by Koukopoulos et al. [8] demonstrating a method for estimating an upper bound for FIFO stability which is, also, based on network parameters. In an alternative interesting work, Lotker et al. [11] proved that any greedy protocol can be stable in any network if the injection rate of the adversary is upper bounded by 1/(d+1), where d is the maximum path length that can be followed by any packet. Also, they proved that for a specific class of greedy protocols, time-priority protocols the stability threshold becomes 1/d. Performance Bounds for Greedy Protocols. Several universally stable protocols have exponential lower bounds on queue sizes and packet delays (SIS, NTS, FTG) [1] . In an interesting work, Adler and Rosén [2] proved tight polynomial bounds for the stability of LIS on DAGs. Especially, they have shown that LIS on DAGs has linear (in the longest path in the network that can be followed by any packet) queue sizes and packet delays.
Stability Issues in Dynamic Networks. Borodin et al. in [4] studied for the first time the impact on stability when the edges in a network can have capacities. They proved that many well-known universally stable protocols (SIS, NTS, FTG) do maintain their universal stability when the link capacity is changing dynamically, whereas the universal stability of LIS is not preserved. Also, the universal stability of networks is preserved under this varying context. The study of stability when link capacities change dynamically has been further extended in [9] presenting involved combinatorial constructions of the adversary that lead LIS and certain compositions of universally stable protocols to instability for a threshold of √ 2 − 1. Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model definitions. Bounds for the LIS protocol on DAGs are presented in Section 3. A bound for the SIS protocol on DAGs is presented in Section 4. Section 5 includes our upper bounds on the stability threshold of any network. We conclude, in Section 6, with a discussion of our results and some open problems.
Model
The model definitions are patterned after those in [3, Section 3] , adjusted to reflect the fact that link capacities may vary arbitrarily as in [4, Section 2] (link capacities may take on integer values in the interval [1, C] with C > 1). A routing network is modelled as a directed graph G =(V, E) with |V | = n nodes and |E| = m edges. Each node v ∈ V represents a communication switch and each directed edge e ∈ E represents a link between two switches that delivers packets only in the direction it is oriented. Every switch has a buffer (queue) at the tail of each out-going link and stores there the packets to be sent on the corresponding link.
Time proceeds in discrete steps. New packets, requiring to traverse predetermined paths, can be injected into the network at any time step. A packet is an atomic entity that resides at a node at the end of any step. It must travel along paths in the network from its source to its destination, both of which are nodes in the network. When it reaches its destination, we say that it is absorbed. During each step, a packet may be sent from its current node along one of the outgoing edges from that node. Edges can have different integer capacities, which may or may not vary over time. Denote C e (t) the capacity of edge e at time step t. That is, we assume that edge e is capable of simultaneously transmitting up to C e (t) packets at time t.
Any packets that wish to travel along an edge e at a particular time step but are not sent wait in a queue for edge e. The delay of a packet is the number of steps spent by the packet while waiting in queues. At each step, an adversary generates a set of requests. A request is a path specifying the route followed by a packet. 2 We say that the adversary generates a set of packets when it generates a set of requested paths. We restrict our study to the case of non-adaptive routing, where the path traversed by each packet is fixed at the time of injection, so that we are able to focus on queueing rather than routing aspects of the problem. There are no computational restrictions on how the adversary chooses its requests in any given time step.
Fix any arbitrary positive integer w ≥ 1. Throughout, for any sequence of time steps T = [t 1 , t 2 ] and for any integer w ≥ 1, denote T ± w the sequence of time steps [t 1 −w, t 2 +w]. For any edge e of the network and any sequence T w of w consecutive time steps, define N (T , e) to be the number of paths injected by the adversary during the time interval T that traverse edge e. For any constant ρ, 0 < ρ ≤ 1, a (w, ρ)-adversary A w,ρ is an adversary that injects packets subject to the following load condition: For every edge e and for every sequence T w of w consecutive time steps, N (T w , e) ≤ ρ τ ∈Tw C(τ ). We say that a (w, ρ)-adversary A w,ρ injects packets at rate ρ with window size w. 
Lemma 2.1 Fix any (w, ρ)-adversary

Lemma 2.1 immediately implies:
2 In this work, it is assumed, as it is common in packet routing, that all such paths are simple paths with no overlapping edges.
Corollary 2.2 Fix any (w, ρ)-adversary
A w,ρ . Then, for any edge e, N ([1], e) ≤ ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ).
Lemma 2.3 Fix any (w, ρ)-adversary A w,ρ . Then, for any time interval T and for any edge
The assumption that ρ ≤ 1 ensures that it is not necessary a priori that some edge of the network is congested (which would surely happen when ρ > 1).
A contention-resolution protocol specifies, for each pair of an edge e and a time step, which packet among those waiting at the tail of edge e will be moved along edge e. A greedy contention-resolution protocol always specifies some packet to move along edge e if there are packets waiting to use edge e. All these contention-resolution protocols require some tie-breaking rule in order to be unambiguously defined. In this work, whenever we are proving a positive result, we assume that the adversary can break the tie arbitrarily; for proving a negative result, we can assume any well-determined tie breaking rule for the adversary. For simplicity, and in a way similar to that in [1] and in works following it, we omit floors and ceilings from our analysis, and we sometimes count time steps and packets only roughly. This may only result to loosing small additive constants, while it implies a gain in clarity.
LIS on Directed Acyclic Graphs
Upper and lower bounds on the performance of LIS on DAGs appear in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Throughout this section, we will consider DAGs, in which nodes are ordered by the topological order induced by the graph. This order assigns to each node v level i ≥ 0, denoted level (v), such that the longest path leading to node v has length i.
Upper Bound
In this section, we present our upper bound on the performance of LIS on directed acyclic graphs. We start by proving:
Proposition 3.1 Consider any packet p injected at time t, and let v be any node of level i ≥ 0 on its path other than its destination node. Then, packet p clears node v by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that
Proof: By double induction on i and on t; the outer induction is on i. The basis case and the induction step of the outer induction are shown by an inner induction on t. Throughout, denote e = v, u the edge over which p has to leave v.
For the basis case of the outer induction, assume that i = 0. Note that in this case any packet that has node v on its path must be injected into node v, since node v has level 0. In particular, packet p is injected into node v. By definition of the LIS protocol, it follows that packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected into v at times t ≤ t.
We prove the claim for the case i = 0 by an inner induction on t.
For the basis case of the inner induction, assume that t = 1. Since w ≥ 1 while, in this case, max{1, t − w + 1} = max{1, 2 − w} = 1, we need to show that packet p clears node v by time 1 + δ(1), where δ(1) > 0 is the least integer such that
Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed only by packets injected into v at time step 1 that have edge e on their path. By Corollary 2.2, there are at most ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) such packets (including p itself). It follows that p will clear v by time 1+δ(1) where δ(1) is the least integer such that
For the induction step, consider any time step t > 1. Consider any packet p injected into v at time t ≤ t − (2w − 1)Cρ. Since t < t, induction hypothesis implies that p clears node v by time t + δ(t ), where δ(t ) is the least integer such that
We continue to prove:
Since C(t) ≥ 1 for all time steps t, it follows that
Since C(t) ≤ C for all time steps t, it follows that
It follows that packet p clears node v by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that
This completes the proof of the inner induction (on t).
The basis case of the outer induction (on i) is now complete. We now proceed to the induction step of the outer induction. We prove the claim for the case i > 0 by an inner induction on t ≥ 1. By definition of the LIS protocol, it follows that packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected either into v or into other nodes that are predecessors of v in the network G at times t ≤ t.
For the basis case of the inner induction, assume that t = 1. Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected at time t = 1 that have edge e on their path. We distinguish between two cases:
• Assume first that packet p is injected into node v. Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed only by packets injected at time step 1 that have e on their path. By Corollary 2.2, there are at most ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) such packets (including p itself). It follows that p will clear v by time 1 + δ(1) where δ(1) is the least integer, such that 1≤τ ≤1+δ(1) C(τ ) ≥ ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) as needed.
• Assume now that packet p is injected into some node different than v. Thus, p arrives at node v over an edge (w, v) for some node w such that
By the induction hypothesis (on i), packet p clears node w by time 1 + δ(1), where δ(1) is the least integer, such that 1≤τ
Thus (1)), where δ(1 + δ (1)) is the least integer, such that
Define now δ(1) to be the least integer, such
It remains to prove that packet p clears node v by time δ (1) .
and packet p clears node v by time 1 + δ(1) + δ (1 + δ(1) ). It follows that packet p clears node v by time δ (1) .
This completes the proof of the basis case of the inner induction (on t).
We proceed now to the induction step of the inner induction, where we assume that t > 1. We again distinguish between two cases regarding the node where packet p is injected.
• Assume first that packet p is injected into node v. Then, clearly, packet p resides at node v by the end of time step t.
• Else, assume that p arrives at node v over an edge w, v for some node w such that level (w) < level (v) = i. By the induction hypothesis (on i), packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t) where δ(t) is the least integer such that
Thus, in any case, packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) is the least integer such that
Consider now any packet
Proof: By definition of δ(t ), it suffices to show that t ≤τ ≤t
Since C(t) ≤ C for all time steps t, it follows that ρ(i + 1) max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) ≤ ρ(2(w − 1) + 1)C(i + 1) = ρ(2w − 1) C(i + 1). Hence, t ≤τ ≤t +((2w−1)Cρ−1)(i+1)+i C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) as needed.
It follows that t +δ(t ) ≤ t +((2w −1)Cρ−1)(i+
1) + i − 1 by Lemma 3.3. But, t + ((2w − 1)Cρ − 1)(i + 1) + i − 1 ≤ t − 1 since t ≤ t − ((2w − 1)Cρ − 1
)(i + 1) − (i + 1) and t − 1 < t. Thus, packet p can be delayed in node v only by packets injected in the time interval [t − ρ(2w − 1)C(i + 1) − (i + 1) + 1, t].
By Lemma 2.3, there are at most ρ max{1,t−ρ(2w−1)C(i+1)−(i+1)+1−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ) such packets.
It follows that packet p clears node v by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+δ(t) C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t−ρ(2w−1)C(i+1)−(i+1)+1−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ) as needed. This completes the proof of the inner induction (on t). Thus, the proof is now complete.
From Proposition 3.1 it immediately follows:
Theorem 3.4 For any DAG G, consider the system G, A w,ρ , LIS . Then, the delay of any packet is at most (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)l(G) + l(G), where l(G) is the length of the longest path in the network.
Proof: Consider any packet p injected at time t with destination v of level (v) = i. Such a packet has to arrive to v over an edge w, v for some node w such that level (w) < level (v) = i. By Proposition 3.1 packet p clears node w (and arrives at v) by time t + δ(t) where δ(t) is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+ δ(t) C(τ ) ≥ ρ(k + 1) max{1,t−ρ(2w−1)C(k+1)−(k+1)+1−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ). Consider now any packet p injected at time step t ≤ t − (2w − 1)Cρi − i. Since t < t, packet p clears node w by time step t + δ(t ), where δ(t ) is the least integer such that t ≤τ ≤t
Lemma 3.5 δ(t ) ≤ (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)i + i
Proof: By definition of δ(t ), it suffices to show that t ≤τ ≤t +((2w−1)Cρ−1)i+i−1 C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) .
Hence, t ≤τ ≤t +((2w−1)Cρ−1)i+i−1 C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) as needed. It follows that packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+δ(t) C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t−ρ(2w−1)Ci−i+1−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ). 
It follows that t + δ(t ) ≤ t + ((2w
− 1)Cρ − 1)i + i − 2 by Lemma 3.3. But, t + ((2w − 1)Cρ − 1)i + i − 2 ≤ t − 1 since t ≤ t − ((2w − 1)Cρ − 1)i − i,(v) = l(G) by time t + δ(t) ≤ t + (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)l(G) + l(G).
Lower Bound
In this section, we present our lower bound on the performance of LIS on DAGs. We show: In order to guarantee that this adversary is a valid one, we should show that the packets that want to traverse any common edge with capacity C at the time of their injection cannot be more than wρC packets. Because the adversary injects in any leaf wρC 2 packets, it suffices to show that any edge is used at most by the packet flows injected in two leaves. Note that if a packet that is injected to a leaf v wants to reach the nodes u 1 and u 2 of the original tree there are two cases depending on whether these nodes are neighbors or not. If these nodes are neighbors, the packet should traverse the edge (u 1 , u 2 ), otherwise it should traverse the edges (u 1 , u 1 ) and (u 1 , u 2 ). For this purpose, the k−|s(u 1 )|−1 least significant bits of s(v) must all be 1's, and the |s(u 1 )| most significant bits of |s(v)| must all match the corresponding bits of s(u 1 ). This can happen for at most two leaves. Thus, at most two leaves send packets that traverse any edge, and therefore any edge is used by at most wρC packets. Evolution of the System Configuration. We show here the evolution of the system configuration at any internal node of the network G k . packets requiring a path with capacity C at time k −Z(v l ). After time k −Z(v l )+w −1 the path they follow to reach v l changes capacity to 1. Therefore, these packets arrive, one per time step, to v l starting at time
Claim 3.8 Consider any node v of
The packets that v l receives from v l are injected by the adversary to
So, the packets from v l and v l arrive to v l at exactly the same time steps. But, the packets coming to v l from v l have been in the system longer than those coming from v l . So, they will have priority over the packets from v l . But, packets from v l have v as final destination. Thus, the first of the packets that v receives from v l , which will be forwarded on (packets coming from Thus, all the packets that v l receives from its left child and passes on to v (which must also have v as their final destination) have priority over any packet that v l receives from its right child and passes on to v. Since v l receives one packet to forward per time step from each of its children, all the packets, which have v as their destination, are forwarded before any packet that has a further destination. There are 
SIS on DAGs
In this section, we present lower bounds on the performance of SIS on DAGs. We show: 
Sketch of proof:
This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6. Again for any integer k ≥ 2 we consider the complete binary tree of height k, G 0 (k) where a binary string s(v), called the label of node v, is assigned to every node v as in Theorem 3.6 (Figure 1 illustrates the network G 0 (4), providing the labels of many nodes.) We construct similarly to Theorem 3.6 the network G(k) that is a subgraph of the complete binary tree of height 2k (Figure 2 illustrates the network G (4) .)
The only difference here to the proof of Theorem 3.6 is the construction of the adversary. More specifically, now we assume that, initially The rest of the proof is similar to the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 3.6. The only differences are that the injection time of packets at each node v is Z(v) instead of k−Z(v) and the initial packets at the leaves of G k leave till time Z(v) + w instead of Z(v) + w − 1. Thus, the total packet delay in the system is Ω(iwCρ) and the largest queue required for the adversary construction is wC + k. For k = C, we take wC + +C = (w + 1)C.
Sufficient Stability Conditions
In this section, we present upper bounds on stability thresholds. We denote d(G) the length of the longest directed path that may be followed by any packet. We still consider the model of dynamic capacities [4] where each link capacity may take on integer values from [1, C] . We first show: ) . For any network G, any adversary A w,ρ and any greedy protocol P, the system G, A, P is stable.
Proof: It suffices to show that any packet that arrives at a queue at time t, leaves this queue by time t + wρ . Our proof is by induction on time t. Basis case: Consider any t ≤ d(G)wρ + 1. Let p be a packet that arrives to the queue e at time t ≤ d(G)wρ + 1. The edge e has unit capacity in the time interval [t, t + wρ ] in the worst-case (unit capacity permits the preservation of the biggest number of packets in the queue). Assume towards a contradiction that p is at the same queue at the end of time t + wρ . This means that for each of the wρ time steps in [t + 1, t + wρ ] some other packet was sent over edge e due to the use of a greedy protocol.
From the definition of the adversary, the largest number of packets that can be injected into the system by the end of time t + wρ − 1 requiring edge e is wρC + 1 packets because C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e (these are the packet p itself, and the wρC packets that were sent over e). Since t ≤ d(G)wρ+1, we have t+ wρ −1 ≤ (d(G)+1)wρ. By the definition of the adversary, the number of packets that require e and they are injected by the end of any time step t ≤ (d(G) + 1)wρ is at most (d(G) + 1)ρ wρC because C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e. Since we assume ρ ≤ t − d(G) wρ . By induction, q left the first queue on its path by time t − d(G) wρ + wρ , left the next queue by time t − d(G) wρ + 2 wρ , and so on. Hence, q arrived at its destination by time t − d(G) wρ + d(G) wρ = t: since the length of its path is at most d(G), all its "arrival times" are earlier than t, so we may apply the inductive hypothesis. So, all the wρ + 1 packets that use e in the interval [t, t+ wρ ] must have been injected in the interval [t−d(G) wρ +1, t]. There are wρ d(G) steps in this interval, and therefore the number of packets that require e and they can be injected during this interval is bounded by d(G)ρ wρC since C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e. Since ρ ≤ 1/Cd(G) the number of packets that are injected during the interval [t − d(G) wρ + 1, t] is at most wρ , a contradiction.
Discussion and Directions for Further Research
In this work, we studied the impact of dynamically changing link capacities (link capacities can take on integer values from [1, C] with C > 1) on the performance bounds of LIS and SIS protocols on DAGs and we obtained stability bounds for greedy protocols running on arbitrary networks. We proved that LIS and SIS protocols have linear performance bounds on DAGs and that there are polynomial stability thresholds for greedy protocols on arbitrary networks depending on the maximum link capacity C and the length of the longest network path. A careful inspection of the lower bounds for LIS and SIS obtained in this work reveals that they, also, hold in a more restrictive case, where link capacities can take on values from the two-valued set of integers {1, C} for C > 1 that will stay fixed for a long time that is at least a constant proportion of the number of packets in the system at the time when the capacity was last set (Quasi-Static Link Capacities Model [9] ). Therefore, the tight bound we prove here for LIS implies the collapse of a powerful model (Model of Dynamic Capacities) to a weaker one (Quasi-Static Link Capacities Model) that is rather surprising.
An open question that remains is if there is a linear upper bound on the packet delay of SIS on DAGs. Also, an interesting question would be to determine polynomial performance bounds for other stable protocols on DAGs such as FTG and NTS.
